Asymmetric information is an important source of inefficiency when assets (like firms) are transacted. The main sources of this asymmetry are unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the asset (quality,...) and unobserved idiosyncratic choices (actions done by the current owners). We introduce moral hazard in a dynamic signaling model where heterogeneous sellers exert effort to affect the distribution of a stochastic signal (sales, profits,...) of their firms. Buyers observe the signal history and make price offers to the sellers. High quality sellers try to separate from the less quality ones in order to receive high price offers, while the latter try to pool with the firsts to avoid receiving a low price. We characterize the competitive equilibria of the model, and we propose an adaption of existing refinements to the incorporation of moral hazard in dynamic signaling that implies uniqueness of equilibria. We find that similar individual characteristics across types of sellers make everyone worse off, since competition increases signaling waste. Also, due to the new intensive margin (effort), non-trivial signaling will take place even when the cost of signaling is large. In particular cases we find analytically solutions, allowing transparent comparative statics analysis. The model can be applied to education where grades depend not only on the skills of students, but also on their effort.
Introduction
We develop a model of dynamic signaling with moral hazard. Buyers learn about the type (i.e. quality) of the asset through a noisy signal that takes place over time. At each moment, the signal depends on the effort exerted by the owner of the asset, which is unobserved by buyers. The cost of providing effort is type-depenent, and effort is more costly for the owners of low quality assets. The model features equilibria where the history of realizations of the signal is used by buyers to update their beliefs about the type of the asset and make price offers. The signaling process takes place until either the seller accepts an offer or voluntarily leaves the market by keeping the asset for himself.
The difference in the cost of signaling allows for partial separation in equilibrium. The signal can be used by the high-quality sellers to separate themselves from the low-quality sellers and potentially get a higher price. Nevertheless, since low-quality sellers can mimic the signal process of high-quality sellers, they will try to pool with them, in order to avoid getting low prices.
Our model tries to capture the fact that, for some non-homogeneous assets (like firms), the owner (potential seller) of the asset has private information about its quality. Potential buyers observe some signals of the quality of the asset, like sales, profits,... Nevertheless, the owner may put some (unobservable) effort into altering the signal distribution in order to convince the buyers that the quality of the asset is high. The cost of signaling an asset as being of "high" quality is likely be lower if the actual quality of the asset is high. The buyers, knowing the incentives of the sellers but not the effort exerted by them, should use the signal to correctly infer the quality.
To our knowledge this is the first model in the literature of dynamic signaling that incorporates moral hazard. Although signaling and moral hazard have been separately studied in dynamic models (see the literature review below), their interaction has not been previously analyzed. We analyze the two main sources of inefficiency in signaling with hidden actions: the non-observability of the type (idiosyncratic characteristics) and the non-observability of effort (idiosyncratic effort choice). The model predicts that when idiosyncratic characteristics are similar across types (similar cost of effort) the inefficiency due to the non-observability of effort is higher. The reason is that when types are similar, it is more difficult for high quality sellers to separate themselves from low quality sellers. In equilibrium, both types increase the effort put on signaling, so the signal is less informative and there is a high signaling waste. Furthermore, we compare our results with the case where effort is perfectly observable, where some times we can get full efficiency. This difference highlights the loss in efficiency due to the incentive compatibility restriction given by the moral hazard.
Like most signaling models, our model exhibits a large multiplicity of equilibria. We adapt one of the standard refinements in this literature (D1 criterion of Cho and Kreps (1983) ) to dynamic signaling with moral hazard. Under this refinement we have existence and uniqueness of equilibria in wide regions of the parameter space. These equilibria are characterized by pooling regions (regions where all asset owners immediately accept the equilibrium price offers) and partially separating regions (regions where signaling takes place and there is no trade). In some of these equilibria all high quality assets are sold, even when the outside option of the sellers is high.
Our model can be also applied to education. Indeed, high-level education is by nature a dynamic process where information (signals) is progressively realized over time. Grades, prizes and test results stochastically depend on individual characteristics (type), such as innate skills, and individual choices, such as effort. Students, knowing their type and past history, decide how much effort they exert to affect the new signals to come. On the other side of the market, firms use the observable signals to infer information about the productivity of each student and use it to make wage offers. If the (utility) cost of effort is correlated with innate skills such as productivity, different types of students would exert different effort levels. Therefore, the signal history can be used to infer choices, correlated with individual characteristics.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, we review the related literature. In Section 2 we discuss our base model, where there is no fixed cost per unit of time. In Section 3 we analyze the robustness of the previous results when we introduce a fixed cost per unit of time. Section 4 concludes. An Appendix contains the proofs of all lemmas and propositions of the previous sections.
Literature Review
Our model is closely related to the literature on preemptive offers, which provides a rationale to why unproductive education may last for long periods of time. Indeed, as Weiss (1983) ? pointed out, in Spence's (1973) model beliefs about the type after the first day of class should be degenerated towards high productivity, so firms can make offers at this point and obtain (part of) the reduction in the worker's educational costs. Nöldeke and van Damme (1990) assume that workers have different educational cost rates and receive public offers by firms. In their model, delaying the acceptance of offers signals low educational costs, and therefore high productivity type. Swinkels (1999) introduces the possibility of private offers, and Hörner and Vieille (2009) make similar arguments in an adverse selection environment. In these models the signals of the workers are given by the rejection of (public or private) offers. Our model focuses on the stochastic nature of the signaling process, as well as on the importance of the intensive margin given by the effort put on signaling. We find that, even when education is not productive and firms can make offers at any moment in time, there is a delay in the expected time of accepting an offer.
There also exists a literature on dynamic signaling with where a (non-random) signal is accompanied by a (random) grade, that is correlated with the agents' type. Daley and Green (2010b) present a static version of this model, and are able to characterize the corresponding signaling equilibria. Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007) and Daley and Green (2010a) introduce dynamic stochastic signaling models. They focus on trade and adverse selection, not on moral hazard. Indeed, in these models the only information that is unknown to the firm is the workers' type (and not the effort put on signaling). We will see that having an extra intensive margin (effort) introduces a moral hazard problem with new interesting economic tradeoffs.
Although our model contains dynamic moral hazard, the modeling assumptions and the questions asked are very different from models in this literature. Indeed, most of the dynamic moral hazard literature (see Chapter 10 of Dewatripont and Bolton (2005) for a survey) focuses on the design of contracts between agent(s) and principal(s) that optimize the hidden actions chosen by agents. In our model, the effort of the sellers is only valuable for signaling reasons (quality remains unchanged), so buyers do not benefit from it. Furthermore, competition among buyers and the inability of the seller to commit will greatly reduce the set of possible contracts (in our model, equilibria).
Finally, our paper is partially related to the literature on reputations. Indeed, our model has one agent with an unobservable type that performs unobservable actions to pool/separate himself with/from other types. In this literature, inaugurated by the seminal works of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , the closest model to ours is in Faingold and Sannikov (2010) , set in continuous time. Our model focuses on the buyers' optimal price offer strategy (prices are in general given in reputation models). Furthermore, the nature of our problem (where the only purpose of the dynamic process is signaling) makes the model here much more tractable, which allows rich comparative statics and general equilibrium analysis.
Base Model
We begin with the simplest version of our model, where there is no fixed cost per unit of time. This will allow us to get analytical results for the effort and value functions and characterize the resulting equilibria. Next section will be devoted to analyze the robustness of the results obtained in this section introducing a fixed cost per unit of time.
There are two types of sellers, low quality (L-)sellers and high quality (H-)sellers. When a seller enters the market (is born), nature assigns him a type. This type is known by seller and unknown by the buyers. Nature also assigns to each seller some observable characteristics that are imperfectly correlated with his type. So, for each seller, buyers share a common prior about his type being H denoted by p 0 ∈ [0, 1].
to a buyer of a L-asset is 0. We assume that sellers can leave the market at any moment, and take an outside option that provides them a present value of 0 ≤ Π 0 < Π. 3 Although it is not an important for most of our results, we will assume that the outside option is type-independent. This will make the arguments more intuitive and the algebra simpler.
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At each moment of time, 2 identical buyers meet the seller and make him a private price offer. These buyers are short lived. We denote the maximum of these 2 offers and Π 0 the offer (stochastic) process P t , and assume that is such that P t ∈ [Π 0 , Π] for all histories. We assume that it is a right-continuous process.
5 No transfers take place during the signaling process. If the seller accepts an offer P t at some time t the process ends, and the buyer makes a lump-sum payment P t to the seller.
A strategy for a seller of type θ ∈ {L, H} is a stochastic process for the effort 6 (e θ,t ) t and a (stochastic) rejection policy (r θ,t (·)) t . We will focus on pure strategies on the decision of accepting an offer. This assumption facilitates our analysis, and avoids tedious technicalities that complicate unnecessarily the model. Then, given ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ R + , r θ,t is a function from the possible offers [Π 0 , Π] to {0, 1}, where 0 means rejecting the offer and 1 accepting it. We assume, fixing ω ∈ Ω, that r −1 θ,t (1) is a right-upper-hemi-continuous correspondence a.s. This implies that given some offer process P t and r θ,t (·), r θ,t (P t ) is right continuous in histories where r θ,t (P t ) = 0.
Fix an offer process P and a strategy (e θ , r θ (·)) for θ-sellers, for θ ∈ {L, H}. Let τ θ,t ≡ inf{s ≥ t|r θ,s (P t ) = 1} be the first time that an offer is accepted after t. The payoff for θ-sellers is composed by the flow cost of providing effort and the lump sum payoff when the game stops. Since, by right-continuity of P t , we have lim s↓τ θ,t P s = P τ θ,t a.s., the payoff for θ-sellers has the following expression:
It is easy to see that, since P is right-continuous, this is a right-continuous process. Furthermore, note that V L,t ≤ V H,t . Indeed, H-sellers have the option of mimicking the strategy of L-sellers.
signaling in education, it can be thought as home production or an additional competitive sector in our economy where the productivity of the workers is Π 0 independently of the type. 4 One could interpret the outside option Π 0 as the value of the physical capital of the firm, that is observed by both the buyer and the seller. We assume that, if the firm is not sold, the seller sells the physical capital at a given price. The type is then interpreted as the non-phyisical capital of the firm, such as name, reputation,..., which value is unknown by the buyer. 5 Right-continuity ensures that information has a well defined first time of arrival. 6 We assume that e θ is such that the signaling process X and the total cost are well defined. Therefore, we assume its Ito integral is well defined. To see the technical details for this see Oksendal (2003) , chapter 3.
Since in this case the signal will have the same distribution, the expected wage will be the same. Nevertheless, by assumption, the total cost of signaling will be lower.
Note that a history for a single buyer is only given by the public signal history X t , so we assume that P is measurable with respect to X. Furthermore, the future payoff of the sellers at time t only depends on the future path of P , that is a function of X t . Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to both sellers and buyers playing public strategies, that is, strategies that are measurable with respect to X.
Remark 2.1. Since there is no time discounting and no fixed cost of time, sellers' payoff is only affected by the expected wage when they are hired (the term E t [P τ θ ,t ]) and the total cost of effort. Therefore, at any moment in time, the sellers' tradeoff will be to exert effort and increase the expected price offer or not do any effort and lower the expected price offer. The channel to translate high effort to high expected prices is the signal, that will be used by the buyers to update beliefs about the sellers.
Beliefs Process
Buyers use the signaling history to update their beliefs about the type of each seller. The payoff to a buyer that makes a price offer is given by the probability of this offer being accepted and, conditional on being accepted, the asset valuation minus the price. So, we need to characterize the beliefs of the buyers after each history in order to determine their strategy.
Buyers will use the (continuous time) Bayes' rule to update beliefs. Assume that buyers believe that sellers are following a strategy (e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} , and that the offer process is P . Then, at histories where r θ,t (P t ) = 0 for all θ ∈ {L, H}, 7 beliefs are updated according the standard continuous time Bayesian updating: 
7 Since r θ,t (P t ) is right continuous when r θ,t (P t ) = 0 for all θ ∈ {L, H}, we can use standard belief updating, so beliefs move continuously.
Fix a strategy profile (e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} , and assume that buyers believe that it is played by the sellers. Consider a seller that exerts an effort process (ẽ t ) t . Then, at histories where r L,t (P t ) = r H,t (P t ) = 0, the drift of p,μ, and the volatility of p,σ, take the following form: 3) where e t refers to the vector (e L,t , e H,t ). Note that when e L,t = e H,t both the drift and the volatility are 0, independently of the effort choiceẽ t . This is an important feature of our model that differs from the standard dynamic signaling models. Indeed, if buyers believe that the signal is uninformative, then sellers cannot change the beliefs of the buyers.
We finally define what beliefs process are consistent with the strategies of the sellers:
Definition 2.1. A beliefs process p is consistent with a strategy profile (e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} and a price offer process P if:
• In all histories X t where no offer is accepted, p t follows the Bayesian update process (2.1).
• If in some history r L,t (P t ) = 1 and r H,t (P t ) = 0 (resp. r L,t (P t ) = 0 and r H,t (P t ) = 1) then beliefs jump to 1 (resp. to 0), that is, lim s↓t p s = 1.
Competitive Equilibria
In this section we define our concept of competitive equilibrium.
Note that after given any history it is optimal for θ-sellers to accept a wage offer P if it is higher or equal than the value of keeping signaling, V θ,t , so r θ,t (P ) = 1 if P > V θ,t , for all θ ∈ {L, H}. Since, by uper-hemi continuity, r θ,t (·) −1 (1) is closed, we have that r θ,t (P ) = 1 also when P = V θ,t .
Letp t (P ) be the beliefs of the buyers about the type seller accepting an offer P being type H, at time t. Then, in equilibrium, it must be the casep t (P ) is given by Bayes' update:
where we used that V L,t ≤ V H,t . Since we are assuming that buyers share beliefs about the sellers and behave competitively, their profits will be 0. Then, in equilibrium, we will assume that buyers offer p t Π when when V H,t ≥ p t Π and less than V L,t otherwise.
Let's define the competitive equilibrium as usual, that is, making each agent (sellers and buyers) behave optimally and consistently with everyone else's strategy: As is common in settings where the only payoff-relevant variable for the uninformed part of the market is the type, we restrict ourselves to Markovian strategies and Markovian equilibria with beliefs as state variable: Definition 2.3. A Markovian competitive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium where both sellers and buyers follow Markov strategies, the state variable being the beliefs about the type of the seller p t . In particular, the strategies of the sellers, (r θ , e θ ) θ∈{L,H} and the offer process P are functions of p.
From now on we will focus on Markovian competitive equilibria, and therefore we will call them simply equilibria. The following lemma establishes an important property of Markovian equilibria Lemma 2.1. In any (Markovian competitive) equilibrium there exists an (maybe empty) open region R ⊆ (0, 1), called rejection region, such that r θ (R) = {0} and r θ ((0, 1)\R) = {1} for all θ ∈ {L, H}, where r θ (p) ≡ r θ (p)(P (p)).
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 31.
We will say that a competitive equilibrium is (partially) separating if R = ∅, and pooling otherwise. When the equilibrium is separating, sellers that are born with prior p 0 ∈ R are partially separated, that is, they may potentially accept different wage offers, depending on the signal history. If, instead, a seller is born with prior p 0 / ∈ R, he is offered max{p 0 Y, Π 0 } and he accepts immediately. Therefore, in pooling equilibria, all sellers with the same initial prior sell at the same price, independently of the quality of their asset.
The Seller's Problem
We first focus on the problem that sellers face. As we will see, given the property of the competitive equilibria established in Lemma 2.1, this will be easy for a given rejection region. In Section 2.3 will introduce a new refinement and will be devoted to analyze the competitive equilibria that passes it.
Using Lemma 2.1 result, and given a Markovian competitive equilibrium with rejection region R and an initial prior p 0 ∈ R, we define the following limits
Then, if the initial prior lies in the region (p, p), since p t moves continuously inside R, the process will stop when p t reaches either p or p (where the seller will accept the corresponding price offer).
If there is a competitive equilibrium with rejection region R and effort (e θ ) θ∈{L,H} it is easy to verify that there is another competitive equilibrium with the same rejection region, with P (R) = {Π 0 } and effort given byẽ
for all θ ∈ {L, H}. Furthermore, for each interval of the form (p, p) ⊆ R as defined before (note that R is the union of a finite or countable set of disjoint open intervals), there is a competitive equilibrium with rejection region (p, p) and with the same effort in (p, p). Therefore, we will first focus in equilibria where R ≡ (p, p), that will be called interval equilibria.
One of the novel features of our model with respect to other dynamic signaling model is the incorporation of unobservable effort. This generates the usual fixed point problem between the beliefs of the buyers about the strategies of the sellers and the strategies that best respond to these beliefs. In order to be able to solve this fixed point problem, we need the following assumption to hold:
, that is, beliefs of the buyers about the effort choice of the sellers are smooth in the rejection region.
Note that the previous assumption restricts the set of possible equilibria, but not the space of best responses by the sellers. Therefore, using the standard stochastic control tools, we will guess that V θ ∈ C 2 (R) ∩ C 0 [0, 1] and we will solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. Then, a standard verification theorem (for example Theorem 11.2.2 in Oksendal (2003)), will ensure that the strategy found is optimal and V θ (·) is the corresponding value function.
Remark 2.2. In continuous-time signaling models without moral hazard it is not necessary to assume smooth conditions on equilibrium objects such as policy functions. Indeed, solutions are found assuming smoothness and, using verification theorems, showing that the guess found is an actual solution. In a signaling model with moral hazard this is no longer the case. Even in versions of this model in discrete time, the equilibrium effort is the result of a fixed point problem. For given a (Markovian) wage process P :
and some strategy (r θ , e θ ) θ∈{L,H} (interpreted as the "beliefs of the buyers" about the strategy of the sellers), we can use standard dynamic programming results to show that there is a unique best response (r θ ,ê θ ) θ∈{L,H} by the sellers. Nevertheless, few things can be said about the beliefs of the buyers (r θ , e θ ) θ∈{L,H} such thatr θ (p) = r θ (p) and e θ (p) = e θ (p) for all p.
Under Assumption 1 we will be able to find explicit solutions for the continuous time model. Furthermore, numerical simulations show that discrete-time versions of this model converge to the continuous time solutions found in this paper when the length of the interval gets small. The key asymptotic feature of the limit that makes it tractable is that asymptotically p moves continuously in R, so the solution of the fixed point problem can be obtained from local conditions (and some boundary conditions), instead of global conditions required in the discrete time versions of the model.
Consider an interval equilibrium with rejection region R = (p, p), with strategy profile for the sellers (e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} . Consider a prior p 0 ∈ R. As we mentioned before, we assume that
, and standard verification theorems will ensure that the solution found will be the actual solution of the problem. Then HJB equation for a seller of type θ ∈ {L, H} is given by
with boundary conditions V θ (p) = P and V θ (p) = P . We differentiate (2.7) with respect toê θ to get the first order condition (FOC). We get
As we see, after imposingê θ = e θ (p) for all θ ∈ {L, H}, Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for
The following lemma establishes the functional form of the policy functions Lemma 2.2. The unique policy functions (e * L (·), e * H (·)) that solve the system of HJB equations (2.7) (one for each type θ ∈ {L, H}) and are consistent with the beliefs of the buyers, 8 have the following functional form:
where C L and C H are positive constants uniquely determined by the boundary conditions on the value functions.
Notice that e * H (·) is decreasing and e * L (·) is increasing. The intuition why it is the case is as follows. As p gets close to the truth, p moves slowly, and therefore it is less worthy to exert effort. Indeed, for any e H (·) and e L (·) (not necessarily equilibrium) we have
Therefore, for example, when p is close to 1, the drift of the beliefs conditional on being of type H (and therefore playing e H (·)) is close to 0. Furthermore, we will see in Section 2.4 that the probability of reaching p is convex for L-sellers and concave for H-sellers (see Figure 4 (a)). Hence, L-sellers expected gain from increasing beliefs is higher the higher are the beliefs, so they have more incentives to exert high effort when p is high. The reverse is true for H-sellers.
Using the FOC (2.8) and the policy functions (2.9), we can find an integral expression for V θ (·)
The boundary condition V θ (p) = P determines the value for C L and C H . Therefore, using the expressions for the policy functions (2.9) we have a system of two equations and two unknowns. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find an analytical expression for C L and C H .
A system of two equations involving integrals with two unknowns may be slow to solve numerically. Nevertheless, we can compute C L and C H solving sequentially, using first that
8 That is, e * θ (p) = e θ (p) for all p ∈ (p, p) and θ ∈ {L, H}.
Since C H = 0, the previous expression is an equation for
and α. Once we know the value of
, C H can be obtained as follows:
Note that, as well as
We can use the equation for (2.10) and the definition of K H to get the following expression for V H :
The previous expression implies the remarkable fact that V H (·) (and the same can be proven for V L (·)) is independent of an important parameter of signaling process, the volatility σ. 11 Nevertheless, the usual intuition says that σ is small, H-sellers can easily signal themselves, and therefore should be cheap to increase the beliefs of the buyers that he is actually type H.
One could think that the non-dependence of the value functions on the volatility is driven by "competition" between types of sellers. Indeed, fixing
, lower σ provides both types of sellers higher incentives to increase the effort, so the increase in efficiency because of a more accurate signal can be counterbalanced by more inefficiency coming from the incentives of players to pool (by L-sellers) or separate (by H-sellers) with/from the other type. Nevertheless we will see that even in the case where A L = ∞ (and therefore e L (p) = 0 ∀p), V H (·) is independent of σ. Therefore, even in the extreme case where only the high quality sellers can make effort to separate themselves from the low quality sellers, the cost of changing the beliefs of the buyers is independent of the accuracy of the signal.
9 Note that, given CL CH , (2.12) is an equation for C H only if α = 2. The reason is that when α = 2, both the HJB equation (2.7) and the FOC (2.8) are homogeneous in (e H (·), e L (·)). This implies that the optimal effort choice is linear in the effort beliefs by firms (Figure 2 ) is linear, so there is no equilibrium with e θ (·) = 0 for some θ ∈ {L, H}.
10 Note that, if
. Using (2.10) we see that this implies e H (p) = 0 for p ∈ (p, p). A same argument can be used to see that in this case e L (p) = 0 for p ∈ (p, p). Since there is no beliefs updating in R = (p, p) and r θ (R) = {0}, we have Although each seller act in isolation (there is no strategic interaction between sellers), there is an indirect competition between types of sellers. Indeed, all (types of) sellers try to increase the drift of X in order to increase the beliefs of the buyers about them and get higher wage offers. A seller "succeeds" if he reaches p and "fails" if reaches p instead. Since the signal informativeness depends one the beliefs of the buyers about the action of both types of sellers, the effort it takes for a seller to succeed depends not only on his individual characteristics (i.e. cost of effort) but also on the other type's characteristics. The following proposition establishes how relative costs and value functions are correlated:
. Let, V θ andṼ θ , for each θ ∈ {L, H}, the corresponding equilibrium value functions. Then,
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 32.
The intuition behind the previous proposition is the following. The more similar are the sellers, the more "competition" one can expect among them. Indeed, when A L is close to A H (lower ratio
, it is easier for the L-sellers to mimic H-sellers, so there will be more signaling waste for the same level of separation. Not only H-sellers benefit from a higher A L (and therefore "handicapping" L-sellers), but L-sellers also better off since, in equilibrium, they exert lower effort. This result is in contrast to some models in races, like Cao (2010) , where it is optimal to handicap the advantaged player.
Remark 2.3. In many signaling models, the binding incentive constraint for the most efficient separating equilibria is the non-mimicking condition for the low quality sellers (see for example Riley (1979) ). This makes the previous result intuitive, since making mimicking more difficult for L-sellers reduces the inefficiency for all sellers. In our model L-sellers still also mimic H-sellers by not taking the outside option, and waiting for p to reach the boundary of the rejection region. Indeed, below we will consider the A L = ∞ (and e L = 0) case, so L-sellers cannot put any effort on signaling. Nevertheless, since the signal is stochastic, the model, none of the equilibria will be completely separating, so some inefficiency will persist.
In the remaining sections of this paper will focus on the case A L = ∞ or, equivalently, L-sellers cannot make any effort, so e L (·) ≡ 0. As we will see, under this assumption we can obtain analytical forms for most of the relevant functions of our basic model (value functions, expected stopping times, profits functions,...). Furthermore, numerical simulations show that all the relevant conclusions that the model offers under this assumption apply to the general case.
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Since now there is no FOC for L-sellers, we have to recalculate the policy function for H-sellers. Doing this we find that the policy functions have the same form as in (2.9), now with C L = 0 and
where
(2.15)
Note that, when α < 2, h is increasing, h(0) = 0 and lim p→1 h(p) = ∞. The reverse is true when α > 2. The value functions V H (·) and V L (·) take the following form
Note that V L does not depend on α. The reason is that, as we will see next section, the probability of reaching p from p is function of just p and p. Since there is no signaling cost for L-sellers, V L is just P plus the probability of reaching p (given in (2.19)) multiplied by P − P .
As mentioned before for the case A L < ∞, note that neither V H nor V L depend on σ 2 . To understand this, we will provide some intuition for the case α > 2 (the other case is analogous). If σ decreases, the equilibrium effort of the H-sellers increases for all p. Therefore, both the speed of learning (defined as change in p per unit of time,μ(·)) and the effort per unit of time increase. We can then calculate the change in p per unit of effort in the following way:
.
As we see, if in the LHS the increase in the numerator is equal to the increase in the denominator, Remark 2.4. The reader may wonder why C H (and therefore e H (p) for all p) is an increasing function of σ when α < 2. Using the FOC (2.8) for θ = H, the optimal effort choiceê H is decreasing in σ, holding fixed the beliefs of the buyers (e L and e H in the RHS of the equation) and V H (p) (we know that it is independent of σ). It seems natural that when the signal becomes less accurate, H-sellers would tend to put less effort into signaling their type. This seems to be even reinforced in equilibrium, since beliefs of the sellers aboutê H would have to consistently be lower, lowering further the RHS of (2.8).
Nevertheless, the previous intuition is only valid when α > 2. Indeed, when α < 2, the previous tatonnement heuristics (a decrease in the beliefs about the effort leads to a decrease in the effort choice that in leads to a decrease in the beliefs about the effort) makes the effort choice to decrease to 0, what is inconsistent with the assumptionê H (p) > 0 for p ∈ (p, p).
13 If, instead, we focus on the non-zero equilibrium-consistent choices, we see that the action is increasing in the choice. This can be seen in Figure 2 , where we see that the effect of increasing σ on the relationship between the beliefs of the buyers about the effort and the optimal response to this beliefs by H-sellers is similar for all α (that is, for the same beliefs e H (p), the effort choiceê H is lower). Nevertheless, the new resulting equilibrium is higher for α < 2 and lower for α > 2.
14 13 Note that if e H (p) = 0 for p > 0 there is no beliefs updating, so p remains constant. This implies that it is better for the sellers to take the price offer (that is at least p Π > 0) that waiting forever and get 0. Therefore, in the rejection region, it is always the case that the effort is strictly positive. 14 The intuition is that, when σ is large, H-sellers need more effort to get the same level of separation. In equilibrium, this high effort makes the signal more informative than when σ is small, what is more efficient when α < 2. As we mentioned before, these two effects cancel each other, leaving V H (·) unchanged.
Figure 2: Optimal choice of e given as a function ofê H (p) in (2.8), for a given p ∈ (p, p), where the black line is for σ 1 and the gray line for σ 2 , with σ 1 < σ 2 . (a) is for α < 2 and (b) is for α > 2.
Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we will define a version of the D1 criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1983) ) and characterize the equilibria satisfying it. As we will see, existence of competitive equilibria depends on whether α is higher or lower than 2. In Section 3 we will see that these differences are robust to introducing a fixed cost per unit of time.
The D1 criterion
In our model, given a strategy profile (e θ , r θ (·)) θ∈{L,H} and an offer process P t , a public history X t is off the path of play if there exist two times t L , t H < t (possibly the same) satisfying r θ,t θ (P t θ ) = 1 at X t θ for all θ ∈ {L, H}. That is, only histories where both types would have to have accepted an offer before are off the equilibrium path.
When a deviation by the sellers is observed, our definition of consistent beliefs is silent on the value of beliefs immediately afterwards. In particular, lots of equilibria can be generated using the "beliefs threat", that is, if in a given history everyone should be accepting but someone does not, p andp are 0 thereafter, so everyone accepts it.
We adapt Daley and Green (2010b) version of D1 (originally defined by Cho and Kreps (1983) ) to allow for moral hazard, using the fact that, in a perfect public Bayesian equilibrium, the continuation play is a new equilibrium. After a deviation is observed, we assume that a new competitive equilibrium will be played afterwards, where the initial beliefs take a new value. The following criterion imposes that beliefs have to move towards the type that is more likely to be better off deviating:
Definition 2.4. For any P ∈ [Π 0 , Π], let E θ (P, p 0 ) be the set of competitive equilibria such that V p 0 θ,0 > P and the initial prior is p 0 , for θ ∈ {L, H}. A competitive equilibrium ((e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} , P, p) satisfies the D1 criterion if, for all t and p 0 ,
where ⊂ is strict inclusion.
Intuitively, once an unexpected rejection is observed, perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes that the continuation play should be optimal given some new beliefs. So, beliefs should move towards the type that is more likely to reject the offer, that is, such that there are more continuation plays where have strict incentives to reject it. Indeed, in our model, in any continuation path, V H is weakly bigger than V L . Therefore, an equilibrium satisfies the D1 criterion if for all accepted offers there is no equilibrium and history where, if made, the decision on taking it would differ a across types.
Finally, let us state the following result that will be useful to characterize equilibria satisfying D1: Lemma 2.3. Define R as the set of the rejection regions of all competitive equilibria. If R ∈ R is such thatR ⊆ R for allR ∈ R, then any competitive equilibrium with rejection region R satisfies the D1 criterion. If, instead, there is someR ∈ R such that (R\R) ∩ ( Π 0 Π , 1) = ∅, then the competitive equilibrium with rejection region R does not satisfy the D1 criterion.
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 33.
For α < 2
The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium that satisfies the D1 criterion, for α < 2: Proposition 2.2. When α < 2, there is a unique 15 competitive equilibrium that satisfies D1. Its rejection region is R = (0, p * ), with
Note that as Π 0 gets close to Π, the region where signaling takes place (the rejection region) increases. This may seem counterintuitive since when Π 0 is close to Π the gains from signaling are low because the most that a seller can gain from signaling is Π − Π 0 . Nevertheless, as we can see in (2.14), when the boundary payoffs are close the equilibrium effort is high when α < 2. Proposition 2.4 will show that this makes signaling more efficient in this case.
It may seem surprising that all H-assets in R are sold at p * . Indeed, when a signal is random and there is no event that happens with positive probability under one type's strategy and with 0 probability under the other type's strategy, complete information is hardly achievable. One could think that the result is driven by the fact that there is no fixed cost of time, so beliefs could get arbitrarily precise in very long time periods. Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 2.4, the expected time of the seller in the process is bounded. Section 3.1 will show the robustness of this result when we include a fixed cost.
In discrete time versions of this model, buyers are never be perfectly convinced in finite time about the type of the sellers. Nevertheless, numerical simulations show that the competitive equilibrium that satisfies D1 is such that the lower bound of R is small. For each length of the period ∆ > 0, the rejection region of the D1-equilibrium takes the form R(∆) = (p(∆), p(∆)), and is such that lim ∆→0 p(∆) = 0. Therefore, asymptotically, the type I error tends to 0. Furthermore, since the effort is large around p(∆) when it is small, beliefs are updated very quickly, and p(∆) can be reached in a relatively short time.
For α > 2
The previous existence and uniqueness result does not carry on when α > 2. As the following proposition states, there is no competitive equilibrium that satisfies the D1 criterion: Proposition 2.3. If α > 2, no competitive equilibrium satisfies the D1 criterion. In particular, there is a function p * (p) satisfying lim p→1 p * (p) = 0 such that (p * (p), p) is the rejection region of a competitive equilibrium for p < 1 large enough, but there is no equilibrium with rejection region (0, 1).
We will provide some intuition about this result below, comparing with the observable effort case. This result is not robust to including a cost per unit of time (i.e. c θ (0) > 0) or discounting when α > 2. Since effort becomes arbitrarily small, the expected time to reach the boundary increases as p goes to 0. Therefore, if there is a fixed time cost, the total payoff gets negative. In Section 3.2 we will study the analogous result when c θ (0) > 0.
Observable Effort
In order to understand the previous results (specially for the case α > 2) we consider a variation of our model where the effort made by the sellers is observable. Note that in our model we have two sources of inefficiency: the non-observability of the type and the non-observability of the effort. Then, let's see how the model changes when we eliminate one of these two sources.
To make the argument simpler, we still focus on the case A L = ∞. To allow L-sellers to mimic H-sellers, 16 in this section we assume that they can (pretend to) do observable effort at 0 cost, but that effort leaves the drift of X unchanged. H-sellers, instead, if they do observable effort e, they incur a cost c H (e), but the drift of X is e as before.
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Proposition 2.4. Fix a rejection region R and assume effort is observable. Fix a positive policy function e H (·) ∈ C 1 (R) and let V H (p, e H ) be the corresponding value function of H-sellers at p.
H ) for all γ < 1 and p ∈ R.
In the limit λ → ∞ and γ → 0, signaling waste disappears.
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 34.
Therefore, given a rejection region, signaling is more efficient when effort is high in the case α < 2, and the reverse is true when α > 2. In particular, when α > 2 the equilibrium effort given in (2.14) is small for p low and p high, and therefore signaling becomes more efficient. Even though it takes more time to reach p, the cost of effort per unit of time is lower, and the total cost decreases. In the α < 2 case, instead, when p is too high, the expected time for p to reach p does not decrease, as will see next section (the effort is high, but p moves slowly when it is close to 1). So, when α < 2, higher accuracy of the signal does not compensate increase in the cost of effort.
Arrival Probabilities and Expected Finishing Times
To provide some intuition about the previous results, let's compute the arrival probabilities and expected finishing times.
Arrival Probabilities
Fix a rejection region R ≡ (p, p). Let π θ (p) denote the probability of reaching p conditional on the seller's type being θ ∈ {L, H} and the beliefs of the buyers being p ∈ (p, p) when the seller Figure 4 : Probability of reaching p in (a), and expected arrival times in (b). Gray and black lines correspond to L-sellers and H-sellers, respectively.
follows the equilibrium strategy. Since buyers correctly update beliefs, we can use the Bayes' rule to get expressions with π H (·) and π L (·). These are given by
The solutions of the previous equations are the following:
Note that this is consistent with the expression (2.17) for V L (·). Indeed, since there is no cost per unit of time and no discount,
Consider the null hypothesis that the seller is type H. Then, 1 − π H (·) is the type I error probability, that is, the probability that the null hypothesis is true but the seller ends up taking the outside option. Figure 4 (a) shows that, when p → 0 type I error disappears. Indeed, lim p→0 π H (p) = 1 for all p > 0.
Expected Arrival Time for α < 2
Fix a competitive equilibrium with rejection region R ≡ (p, p). Given a seller with type θ ∈ {L, H} and prior p 0 , let τ θ (p 0 ) denote the offer-accepting stopping time. Let T θ (p) be the expected time before an offer is accepted, that is
Therefore, T θ (·) can be thought as the value function for a flow payoff of 1 while the project is active and 0 when it stops. Hence, T θ (·) satisfies the following HJB equation:
with boundary conditions T θ (p) = T θ (p) = 0. The previous equation can be analytically solved. We focus in the limiting case p → 0, since this is the relevant case for the competitive equilibrium satisfying D1. After some amount of algebra, T H and T L can be expressed in the following way Figure 4 (b) plots these functions for different values of p. We see that T H (0) = 0. Even though for each p > 0 we have T H (p) = 0, we have lim p→0 T H (p) > 0 for all p > 0. The rationale, as we explained before, is that lim p→0 e H (p) = ∞, so in the limit the unbounded effort around 0 generates a "wall" in the beliefs.
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Fixed Cost of Signaling
In this section we check the robustness of our previous results when we introduce a fixed cost of time. As we will see, the qualitative results when α < 2 are essentially unchanged. The results when α > 2 change and, instead, a unique D1-equilibrium will always exist.
For simplicity we still restrict ourselves to the case A L = ∞, that is, when L-sellers will not make effort to signal themselves. Repeating the same procedure we used in Section 2.2 to get the expression for e H , we find the following expression:
where C 1 is a constant to be determined.
Unfortunately, now there is no closed form for V H (p). This complicates our analysis, since it will be difficult to know the properties of p and p for c 0 > 0. Then, it will be impossible to verify whether the equilibrium condition V L (p) ≥ Π 0 for all p is satisfied or not.
19 Indeed, to verify this condition we need to know e H (·), p and p, and then solve for the HJB equation of the L-sellers. We instead assume that c 0 is a fixed cost that H-sellers incur if they exert positive effort, so their total cost is
The cost (and the effort) for L-sellers remains equal to 0. 20 Under this assumption it is always the case that V L (p) ≥ Π 0 for all p, for the same reason as in c 0 = 0 case. This implies that Lemma 2.1 still applies in this case.
Before characterizing equilibria, we will establish a lemma about the smoothness of the value function. Note that in our model we cannot apply the usual theorems about smooth pasting conditions for the value functions. In our model many interval equilibria like the one described in Section 2.2 can be constructed by imposing 0 effort outside the rejection region, without requiring any smooth pasting condition. Nevertheless, the D1-criterion allows us to restrict ourselves to smooth value functions: Lemma 3.1. (smooth pasting condition) Assume that there exists an equilibrium satisfying D1 with value function V H (·) for H-sellers. Then V H (p) ∈ C 1 (0, 1).
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 35.
Case α < 2
As we mentioned before, the results for c 0 = 0 when α < 2 are qualitatively the same when c 0 > 0. The intuitive reason is that, in the equilibrium described in Section 2.3, H-sellers' equilibrium effort is bounded away from zero in the rejection region, inf p∈R c H (e H (p)) > 0. Therefore, since the (effort) cost per unit of time is bounded away from 0, including an extra fixed cost should not qualitatively change the results.
The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibria satisfying D1 for all values of c 0 and Π 0 : Proposition 3.1. For each pair (c 0 , Π 0 ), there exists a unique p * ∈ (
, 1) such that (0, p * ) is the rejection region of the unique equilibrium satisfying D1.
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 36.
It may be surprising that type I error is 0 even when c 0 is high. We see that, when Π 0 > 0, the rejection region contains (0,
), so signaling takes place in a potentially large region of the beliefs space. In models where the drift is exogenous, the size of the region where the signaling takes place becomes arbitrary small or disappears when the fixed cost rises. Nevertheless, when the effort is endogenous, the equilibrium effort may be bigger when the fixed cost is high. In this case, the quality the signal is high when the cost is high, and therefore accelerates the process, what compensates the high cost per unit of time.
Case α > 2
As we saw in Section 2.3, no equilibrium satisfies the D1-criterion when α > 2 and there is no discounting and no cost per period. This result is extremely fragile to the second of these assumptions. Let's see what are the implications of introducing a fixed cost per unit of time. 
) is the rejection region of the unique equilibrium that satisfies D1.
2. For c 0 ≥c 0 the only competitive equilibrium is complete pooling, and therefore satisfies D1. Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 37.
The intuition for the non-existence of equilibria is clear. A higher cost per unit of time requires a higher effort for the signaling to be informative enough (and then learning fast enough) to make signaling worthwhile. When α < 2, we saw that increasing the effort compensates the increase in cost per unit of time enough to maintain the existence of equilibria. Nevertheless, for α > 2, the higher convexity of the cost function makes providing high effort too costly to make signaling worthwhile.
Note that when there is high noise (σ big), the signal is less precise, so signaling becomes less valuable, and the existence constraint gets tighter (i.e.c 0 gets smaller). The same happens when signaling is more costly (A H high.) Finally, when Π is higher, separation becomes more profitable, so the existence constraint is relaxed. We see that for c 0 small p is close to 0 and p is close to 1. Then, we recover the result established in section 2.3 that, when c 0 = 0, we can get equilibria very close to full separation. When c 0 increases, the region of partial separation shrinks, disappearing when c 0 reachesc 0 .
Consider now the case that the outside option is higher than the value of the L-assets to the buyers, i.e. Π 0 > 0. The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibria in this case, Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 39.
In Figure 6 (a) we see that, when c 0 is low, p is close to 0 and p is close to 1, that is, the equilibrium is close to full separation, as we obtained in the c 0 = 0 case. As c 0 gets large, both curves get closer to Π 0 Π . Indeed, in when the fixed cost increases signaling is very costly, so only takes place in a small region around
. Therefore, when c 0 is large, for most of initial beliefs p 0 the seller is either immediately hired (if p ≥ p) or takes the outside option (if p ≥ p), independently of his type. Only in a small neighborhood of the indifference region (when p 0 Π ≃ Π 0 ) there is signaling and some separation.
In Figure 6 (b) we plot p and p as a function of Π 0 Π , for two different values of c 0 . Again we see that, the higher is the cost, the smaller is the region where signaling takes place. Furthermore, we see that when Π 0 is small most of the sellers accept an offer immediately. The reverse is true when Π 0 is close to Π.
Observable Effort
As we did in Section 2.3 we now analyze the case when the effort is observable. Note that the result obtained in Proposition 2.4 for α < 2 remains the same. Indeed, when the effort is very large the (expected) signaling time is very small, and so is the total fixed cost. Therefore, the seller has further incentives to increase the effort.
The result obtained in Proposition 2.4 changes when c 0 > 0 and α > 2. The reason is that if effort is very low, the (expected) signaling time is very large, and therefore also is the total time cost. The following proposition establishes the analogous result for c 0 > 0: Proposition 3.4. When effort is observable, c 0 > 0 and α > 2, the optimal effort choice by H-sellers is a constant effort equal to
Proof. Proof in the appendix at page 41.
The intuition of the previous result comes from the envelope theorem. When we change p, the change in the payoff of the flow value of the seller (the maximand in expression (2.7)) can be decomposed into a direct in the change in p and the change of e H (p). Nevertheless, since now the seller fully internalizes the change in e H (p), the envelope theorem tells us that only the direct effect takes place, and therefore e H (·) remains constant.
The previous proposition allows us to recover the case where the drift is constant but type dependent (e OE * for H-sellers and 0 for L-sellers) and there is a cost per unit of time. Indeed, models in the literature where the drift depends on the type (but not on the effort) can be reinterpreted as optimal behavior when the effort is observable (but not the type).
Conclusions
We fully characterize the equilibria of a model with dynamic signaling and moral hazard. By introducing a new intensive margin (the effort) the model provides insights how the interaction between different sources of asymmetric information affect the signal dynamics.
Our model allows us to compare the strength the two main causes of inefficiency in signaling in dynamic signaling with hidden actions: the non-observability of the type and the non-observability of the effort. We have seen that, for a given equilibrium, the more similar are the sellers (that is, the more similar are their cost functions) the lower is their payoff. Indeed, if different types of assets are similar, the incentive by the low type sellers of pooling with the high types makes the signal less informative and more wasteful. When effort is observable, we saw that full efficiency can be restored when there is no fixed cost of time. When there is a fixed cost of time and the effort curve is convex enough, instead, the optimal effort is constant, what endogenously provides a rationale for some assumptions made in other models in the literature.
Using adapted to moral hazard in dynamic signaling, we have existence and uniqueness of equilibria in most of the parameter configurations. Hence, we can investigate how the asymmetric on information on the type and the effort affect the misallocation of assets and the signaling waste. The competitive equilibria of our model exhibit a non-regection region in the space of beliefs, where no asset is traded, and a pooling region, where assets are immediately traded. We see that, if the cost function has a low degree of convexity, the signaling region may be wide even if the fixed cost of signaling is high. Surprisingly, even with a stochastic signal, all highly quality assets are sold (that is, no type I error takes place) for some parameter values. Although this is not a property of discrete-time versions of this model, numerical simulations show asymptotically holds in sequences of equilibria of discrete versions of our model.
When there is no fixed cost of time, the value functions of the sellers do not depend on the accuracy of the process. This is a property that makes the model suitable for empirical work, since makes the wages independent of the underlying signaling process, that is unobserved by the econometrician. The volatility is still identified by the expected stopping times. If, instead, the fixed time cost is small but positive, this property will be still valid at first order.
Future research will be devoted to generalize the results to allowing low types to exert effort when there is a fixed cost of time and introducing additional types. Nevertheless, numerical simulations show that all results of our model are robust to these extensions. Introducing usefulness of the signal (such as productive education) may also introduce new interesting tradeoffs.
Weiss, A., 1983, "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 420-42. 3
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1 (page 9)
Proof. Consider beliefs p t ∈ (0, 1) is such that r L (p t ) = r H (p t ). Note that, since V H ≥ V L and {P |r θ (p)(P ) = 1} is closed, if an offer is accepted by H-sellers then it is accepted also by L-sellers. Suppose that r L (p) = 1 and r H (p) = 0. At beliefs p, L-sellers receive a payoff of Π 0 (since they are the only ones dropping out) and H-sellers receive a payoff of Π (since beliefs jump to 1 afterwards).
Since there is no cost for L-sellers mimic H-sellers, they can deviate and get a payoff of Π instead of Π 0 , what contradicts optimal behavior. Therefore, in equilibrium, r L,t = r H,t whenever p t ∈ (0, 1). Now let's show that R is open. Consider p ∈ (0, 1) such that r θ (p) = 0 for all θ ∈ {L, H}. By right hemi-continuity of r θ,t when r θ,t (P t ) = 0 there is beliefs updating around p. Therefore, there exists a neighborhood of p such that where no offer is accepted.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 (page 12)
Proof. We impose the equilibrium conditionê θ (p) ≡ e θ (p) in the FOC (2.8). Using (2.8) for θ = H and the corresponding HJB equation (2.7) we find the following expression for e
Using the same equations for θ = L and the previous expression for e ′ L (p) we obtain the following expression that e L (·) and e H (·) must satisfy:
Note that since e H (p) = e L (p) for p ∈ R, the previous equation is a first order ordinary differential equation for e H (p). This allows us to find the policy functions, that are exactly those given in (2.9), where C L and C H are constants to be determined by the boundary conditions on V θ (·). Now let's prove that C L and C H exist and are uniquely determined by the boundary conditions. Define c ≡
. Given a value for c, it is trivial to see that C H and C L are unique from equation (2.12). So, we will focus on the existence and uniqueness of c. It is easy to see that, when c = 0, the RHS of the expression (2.11) is positive. Note that the upper limit on c isc ≡
is the value that makes the denominator 0 (and e H (p) = e L (p)). Using basic calculus it is easy to see that the RHS expression (2.11) tends to −∞ when c →c. Since it is clearly continuous for c ∈ (0,c), we have that a solution for c exists.
To show the uniqueness we use the change of variables q → m ≡ q 1−q c −2/α . After some amount of algebra, we have that the equation (2.11) for c is equivalent to
where m − (c) ≡ 
where m − ≡ m − (c) and m + ≡ m + (c). The previous equation is clearly signed because m − < m + < 1. Hence, since f is monotone, it has at most one 0. Therefore, the solution is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 (page 14)
Proof. We will only do the proof for the case θ = H, since the case θ = L is analogous. Note that the RHS of (2.11) is decreasing in
, and, as it can be seen in the proof of Lemma 2.2, decreasing in c. This implies that c is increasing in
. We use the equation (2.13) to get the following expression:
Note that the RHS of the previous expression is clearly increasing in p, and it is easy to see that is continuous in c. Also, the integral of V ′ H between p and p is P − P , independently the value of
Since the RHS of the previous expression is monotonically increasing in p, this implies that
Proof of Lemma 2.3 (page 18)
Proof. Note first that in any competitive equilibrium, if V θ (p) < V θ (p) for some p,p ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ {L, H}, then p <p. This is true because V θ ∈ C 0 [0, 1], V θ (p) = max{Π 0 , p Π} for p / ∈ R and V ′ θ (p) > 0 for p ∈ R, as we see in (2.10), for all θ ∈ {L, H}.
Assume that a competitive equilibrium with strategy profile ((e θ , r θ ) θ∈{L,H} , P ) and with rejection region R exists and is such thatR ⊆ R for allR ∈ R. So, for any rejection regioñ R ∈ R and equilibrium, ifṼ H (p) > p Π for somep and p / ∈ R (so p / ∈R), then it is the case thatp > p, soṼ L (p) > p Π (by the first part of this lemma). Therefore, E L (max{Π 0 , p Π},p) = E H (max{Π 0 , p Π},p) for all p andp. Hence, this implies that the D1 criterion imposes no restriction on the beliefs following a deviation at p / ∈ R. So, in particular, beliefs may remain constant (using e L (p) = e H (p) = 0), so there is no incentives to deviate. Therefore, an equilibrium with rejection region R satisfies the D1 criterion. Now assume that there is a competitive equilibrium with rejection region R satisfying the D1 criterion. Assume that there is some competitive equilibrium with rejection regionR and there is somep ∈R\R such thatp Π > Π 0 . Note that, sincep ∈R,p < 1. Definep andp as in (2.5) and (2.6) (withp andR instead of p and R). Sincep <p andṼ H (p) >Ṽ L (p) for all p ∈ (p,p) (this can be seen from the explicit functional forms (2.10)) there exists somep
, so the D1 criterion imposes that after a rejection atp, beliefs must jump to 1. So, all types have incentives to not take the offerp Π atp since, by rejecting it, they get Π instead ofp Π. This contradicts the existence of a competitive equilibrium with rejection region R (such thatp / ∈ R) satisfying the D1 criterion.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 (page 19)
Proof. The proof is the same as the one for Proposition 3.1. In Proposition 3.1 the result is proven for c 0 > 0, but the argument still applies for c 0 = 0. The particular value of p * is obtained by solving the equation
Proof of Proposition 2.3 (page 20)
Proof. We will prove this proposition by finding an explicit sequence of interval equilibria where the corresponding sequence of rejection regions, R n = (p n , p n ) tends to (0, 1). We will argue that there is no equilibrium with R = (0, 1). Therefore, by Lemma 2.3, no equilibrium will satisfy the D1-criterion.
For any given p ∈ (
, 1) and p ∈ (0, p), let's define the following function:
Note that V H (p; p) = p Π and ∂ ∂p V H (p; p) = Π. Since, for α > 2, lim p→0 h(p) = ∞, we have that
It is easy to show that
. Therefore, there exists a function p * : (
It is easy to verify that p * (p) also satisfies
Hence, for each p ∈ ( α−1 α , 1) there is an interval equilibrium with rejection region (p * (p), p). Furthermore, it is easy to see that V H (p; p) is increasing in p when p ∈ (
It is easy to see that lim p→1 V (p; p) = Π for all p, so lim p→1 p * (p) = 0. So, any increasing sequence (p n ) n with lim n→∞ p n = 1 generates the desired sequence of equilibria. Figure  3 (b) shows V H (·) for some equilibria of a sequence like this, being the black first line, the gray line second and the dotted line third.
Assume R = (0, 1). In this case, using (2.14), the corresponding policy function for the Hsellers is e H (p) = 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1). Nevertheless, in this case there is no beliefs updating, so V H (p) = 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1), what is clearly a contradiction. Proposition 2.4 will shed light on why low effort is more efficient when α > 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 (page 21)
Proof. Fix a p 0 ∈ R and define p and p as in (2.5) and (2.6). Fix e H ∈ C 1 (p, p) positive. Assume α < 2 (the case α > 2 is analogous). The equation that the value function for the H-sellers exerting effort e H is given, in (p, p) by the following HJB equation
and boundary conditions V H (p) = P and V H (p) = P . Let V H (p, e H (·)) be its solution. Let's consider the following decomposition:
h (p) = 0, and we impose V h (p) = P and V h (p) = P . This leads to
This is exactly the expected payoff when the signaling waste is 0 (note that the homogeneous equation is "as if" A H = 0), that coincides with the expected accepted price offer conditional on being type H (we can see this using the formula (2.19)). Note that V t (p; e H ) must satisfy (5.1) and V t (p; e H ) = V t (p; e H ) = 0. Consider λ > 1. Then, it is the case that
This is true because both V t (p, λ e H ) and V t (p, λ e H ) satisfy the same equations and boundary conditions (equal to 0 at the boundary). Therefore, increasing the effort by a factor λ > 1, the absolute value of V t (p, λ e) is reduced by a factor λ α−2 < 1. Finally, note that V t (p, λ e) < 0 ∀p ∈ (p, p). Indeed, it is the solution of a boundary problem with negative flow payoff and with 0-value at the boundary. Therefore, increasing the effort we increase V H , and we make asymptotically equal to V h , that is, waste asymptotically disappears.
. Simple algebra shows that
The first condition is a necessary condition for (p, p) to be an equilibrium when
Using simple algebra we find that when α < 2, there exist a unique p † such that
For α > 2, as we will see in the proof of Proposition 3.2, (5.4) ). Therefore, since by assumption V H (p) = p Π, it must be the case that p >p − , so
For α < 2, the value function (5.3) is well defined for all p ∈ (0, 1). In this case, p can be increased to p+ε, for ε > 0 small, such that p * (p+ε) exists, and satisfies ∂ ∂p V H (p, p+ε) > Π. Since V H (p, p+ε) > V H (p, p) for all p, p * (p+ε) < p. This, by a similar argument than before, contradicts the assumption that p does not belong to the rejection region of any competitive equilibrium.
When α > 2, the term inside the parenthesis of the denominator of (5.3) may not be well defined. It is easy to see that it is well defined for p ≥ p. In particular, given p, there either the denominator is well defined for all p or there exists some function 0 <p 0 (p) < p such that it is not well defined for p <p 0 (p) and well defined otherwise. Furthermore, ifp 0 (p) exists, it is continuous in p and lim p→p 0 (p)
∂ ∂p
V H (p, p) = 0. Since, by assumption, ∂ ∂p V (p, p) >, then p >p 0 (p) ifp 0 (p) exists. Now, using the same argument as in the α < 2, p can be increased by ε > 0 small such that (p * (p + ε), p + ε) is the rejection region of an equilibrium. This contradicts our initial assumption.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (page 25)
Proof. We will prove this proposition by explicitly constructing the equilibrium.
Define V H (·, ·) and p † as in the proof of Lemma 3.1. Since lim p→0 V H (0, p) = 0 and V H (p, p)
is decreasing in p when p < p † , we have that that V H (0, p † ) < 0. Furthermore, by simple eye inspection we see that lim p→1 V H (0, p) = Π. Therefore, by continuity and since V H (p, p) is increasing in p when p > p † , for each Π 0 there exists a unique p * (Π 0 ) ∈ (p † , 1) such that
Let's show that there is an equilibrium with rejection region R = (0, p * (Π 0 )). Let's denote V H * (p) ≡ V H (p, p * (Π 0 )). Then, since the boundary conditions are satisfied, we only need to show Assume that c 0 <c 0 , fix an equilibrium andp satisfying the previous properties. Let's definẽ v − ≡ inf{ṽ|V H (p;p,ṽ) > p Π ∀p <p} andṽ + ≡ inf{ṽ|V H (p;p,ṽ) > p Π ∀p >p}. Note that, since lim p→1 V H (p;p,ṽ) = ∞, we havep Π <ṽ + < ∞. Assumeṽ + ≤ṽ − (the other case is analogous). By continuity, there exists some p such that V H (p;p,ṽ + ) = p Π. Note that p is unique. Indeed, by the previous argument ∂ 2 ∂p 2 V H (p;p,ṽ + ) has two zeros when c 0 <c 0 (one lower thanp and the higher thanp), and p must be higher than the higher zero, so ∂ 2 ∂p 2 V H (p;p,ṽ + ) > 0. Since V H (p;p,ṽ) ∈ C 1 (p, 1), it must be the case that ∂ ∂p V H (p;p,ṽ + ) = Π, and therefore V H (p;p,ṽ + ) = V H (p, p), where V H is defined in (5.3). Recall that V H (p, p) is increasing and continuous in p. Furthermore, by assumption (sinceṽ − >ṽ + ), there exists some p <p such that V H (p, p) = p. Define p * = inf{p|V H (p, p) > p Π ∀p < p}. Using standard calculus, it is easy to prove that there exists some p * < p * such that V H (p * , p * ) = p * Π and Finally, to show that the equilibrium found satisfies D1 we can use a similar argument that in the proof of Lemma 3.1. Indeed, it is easy to see that for all competitive equilibria there must exist another equilibrium with a bigger rejection region satisfying the smooth pasting condition. Nevertheless, the fact that that V H (p, p) is increasing in p ensures that there is no equilibrium satisfying the smooth pasting condition other than the one that we just defined. , it is easy to show that exists some p > Π 0 Π such that V H (p, p) = max{Π 0 , p Π} and V H (p, p) > p Π for all p ∈ (p, p). Therefore, a competitive equilibrium (with rejection region R = (p, p)) exists.
Using simple algebra it is easy to show that ∂ ∂p V H (p, p) < 0. Furthermore, we see that lim p→0 V H (p, p) = ∞ for all p > 0 and lim p→1 V H (p, p) = ∞ for all p > 0. Also, twice differentiating (5.5), we see that ∂ 2 ∂p 2 V H (p, p) has at most 2 zeros. Therefore, there exist one and at most two pairs of values (p 1 , p 1 ) and (p 2 , p 2 ), with p 1 < p 2 , such that V H (p i , p i ) = p i Π, ∂ ∂p V H (p i , p i ) = Π contradicts our assumption, since p 2 = p 4 > p 0 ≥ p 2 . Furthermore, if p 2 < p 0 , there is somep ∈ (p 2 , p 2 ) such that V (p, p 2 ) <p Π. The reason is that V (·, p 2 ) = V (·, p 2 ), p 2 < p 0 < p 2 , V (p 0 , p 0 ) = p 0 Π and V (p, p) is increasing in p. Finally, if p 2 = p 0 then p 1 = p 0 and p 1 = p 2 . Therefore, in this case, the equilibrium that satisfies the smooth pasting condition with biggest rejection region equal to the union of the (disjoint) intervals (p 0 , p 0 ) and (p 1 , p 1 ).
In each case it can be shown that the corresponding equilibrium satisfies D1 using a similar argument that in the proof of Lemma 3.1. Indeed, it easy to see that if any of them does not satisfy D1, there must exist an equilibrium with a bigger rejection region satisfying the smooth pasting condition. Nevertheless, as we have shown, each of the proposed equilibria is the one with biggest rejection among all equilibria satisfying the smooth pasting condition.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 (page 28)
Proof. The problem of maximizing the value function of H-sellers can be written as a regular stochastic control problem, since now there is no incentive constraint:
The FOC of the previous equation is
2 e H (p) .
Note that since α > 2 the SOC is satisfied. Using the previous two equations to solve for e H (p) it is easy to verify that the statement of the proposition is true (note that the terms of both equations involving p are identical).
